Abstract
We have looked at various possible ways of assessing the thesis that ‘Time is tenseless’. So far, that thesis has been lent little if any support by what we have found. There remains to be considered what is arguably the most promising way of setting up a case for the ‘tenseless’ view: I mean, by proposing that tensed sentences are susceptible of tenseless truth-conditions.
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Notes
Priest, ‘Tense and Truth-Conditions’, in Analysis 1986, pp. 162–6
Priest, ‘Tense, Tense and TENSE’, in Analysis 1987, pp. 184–7.
Prior, Objects of Thought, ed. Geach and Kenny, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 59.
See, for example, Bostock, Logic and Arithmetic, Oxford University Press, 1974.
For the ‘wrapping’ terminology, see Prior, ‘Is the Concept of Referential Opacity Really Necessary?’, in Acta Philosophica Fennica, 1963.
See Teichmann, ‘“Actually”’, in Analysis 1990, pp. 16–19.
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© 1995 Roger Teichmann
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Teichmann, R. (1995). Truth-Conditions. In: The Concept of Time. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230373877_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230373877_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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