Abstract
Some philosophers assume that if our topic is time and the nature of time, we will be talking off the subject so long as we discuss language. These philosophers do not necessarily eschew the use of such expressions as ‘tensed’ and ‘tenseless’, however. I pointed out earlier on that since tense is first and foremost a feature of language, an application of such an adjective as ‘tensed’ to time looks to be more or less metaphorical; certainly, applications of this sort will stand in need of explanation. And philosophers who professedly want to ‘get away from’ the merely linguistic, while using prima facie linguistic terminology, owe us that explanation.
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Notes
Perry, ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’, in Nous, 1979.
See Moore, ‘Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930–33’, Philosophical Papers London, 1959, pp. 306–10.
Richard, ‘Temporalism and Eternalism’, in Philosophical Studies, January 1981.
Altham, ‘Indirect Reflexives and Indirect Speech’, in Intention and Intentionality: Essays in Honour of G. E. M. Anscombe, ed. Diamond and Teichmann, Harvester Press 1979, pp. 31–2.
Castaneda, ‘Indicators and Quasi-Indicators’, in American Philosophical Quarterly 1967, pp. 85–100.
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© 1995 Roger Teichmann
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Teichmann, R. (1995). Facts, Knowledge and Belief. In: The Concept of Time. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230373877_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230373877_2
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