Gender and Work-Life Flexibility in the Labour Market

Abstract

A friend had a job playing in The Mousetrap in London. It was a one-year contract (with no chance of renewal), involved 8 shows a week (6 evenings and 2 matinees), and contained a gratuity clause where he would be penalised £50 (from the end-of-contract gratuity) for every show he missed, even if due to illness. This contract reflects the sort of labour market flexibility desired by some employers, with no employment protection, with effectively no sick pay, and with unsocial hours. Employers would argue that this flexibility serves a clear functional purpose. The unsocial hours are necessary since not many people would go to see a performance at 9 in the morning. The one year limit on employment is necessary since a regular turnover of cast is important to keep the show fresh. Absences — even due to illness — need to be discouraged since it is undesirable to have understudies rather than cast members perform. Employers would also argue that workers receive the appropriate compensation for this flexibility. While this particular contract can be extremely attractive to some individuals — and indeed there is no difficulty in recruiting new cast members — it would also be extremely inconvenient to others. In a competitive labour market, the rate of pay would contain ‘compensating differentials’ — by which is meant that wages must be higher if a job is unattractive to compensate for the disutility of working there and lower if a job is attractive.