Discussion: The Dualism of Facts and Standards

Abstract

One of F. A. Hayek’s contentions about the concept of social rights is that it entails the concept of social or distributive justice. According to Hayek, the concept of social justice is simply meaningless in a market order: ‘social justice does not belong to the category of error but to that of nonsense, like the term of a “moral stone”.’¹ It is important to stress this point. Hayek has also criticized some particular views of social justice, the ones entailing common patterns of distribution, but he has been always keen on highlighting the fact that he is not basing that critique upon a particular defence of any specific pattern of distribution as opposed to other specific ones. What he wants to assert is that the discussion about the justice or injustice of results in a market order is meaningless. In other words, Hayek maintains that he is not embracing his own particular conception of social justice as opposed to other particular ones.

The dualism of facts and standards is, I contend, one of the bases of the liberal tradition. For an essential part of this tradition is the recognition of the injustice that does exist in this world, and the resolve to try to help those who are its victims. This means that there is, or that there may be, a conflict, or at least a gap, between facts and standards … Liberalism is based upon the dualism of facts and standards in the sense that it believes in searching for ever better standards, especially in the field of politics and of legislation.

Karl R Popper, Addenda to

The Open Society and its Enemies, 1961