Abstract
In July 1932 Whitehall made a start on the considerable preparations demanded for a World Economic Conference. From the outset such enthusiasm as there was for the conference amongst its principal international sponsors — Britain, the United States and France — depended upon their perception that it would afford opportunities to debate (and criticise) the economic and monetary policies of the other participants. The French government saw the conference as an opportunity to air their misgivings about the Federal Reserve’s increased open-market operations which had fuelled rumours that the United States would devalue the dollar sometime soon.1 More importantly, it offered the chance to determine the future direction of British monetary policy and to press for the return of sterling to gold. This French interest was shared by the US Treasury and Federal Reserve, although the Americans also paid close attention to the evolution of the British tariff (the General Tariff was introduced in April 1932 and the Imperial Tariff in July 1932), an issue of little interest to France but which Germany recognised to be, for reasons which will become apparent below, of potential benefit to its plans to secure further debt concessions from its creditors.
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© 1996 Patricia M. Clavin
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Clavin, P. (1996). The Rise of Economic Nationalism. In: The Failure of Economic Diplomacy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230372696_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230372696_3
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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