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The Rise and Fall of the Alliance

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Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon

Part of the book series: St Antony’s Series ((STANTS))

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Abstract

Born of the ambition ofone willful, reckless man, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon was anchored in delusion, propelled by deceit, and bound to end in calamity.1

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Notes and References

  1. Uzi Benziman, Sharon — An Israeli Caesar (London: Robson Books, 1987), p.184.

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  2. Ibid, p.263.

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  3. Ibid, p. 199.

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  4. Interview with Prime Minister Begin on Israel radio, 28 April 1981, as reproduced in Meron Medzini, Israel’s Foreign Relations, Selected Documents 1981–1982, Vol. 7 (Jerusalem: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1988).

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  5. Zvi Lanir, Sikunim Be Levanon (Risks in Lebanon) (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p.6.

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  6. Joseph Vashitz, ‘Did the Palestinians abet the initiation of the war and if so, why?’, New Outlook, 26:6, 1983, p.26.

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  7. Interview with Shafic al-Hout as cited in Kirsten E. Schulze, Israeli Security Policy in South Lebanon: An Analysis of the Forces and Perceptions Shaping the Policy-Making from 1976 to 1985, unpublished M.Phil thesis, Oxford University, 1992.

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  8. Frederic Hof, Galilee Divided (Boulder: Westview Press 1985), p.97.

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  9. Rex Brynen, ‘PLO Policy in Lebanon: Legacies and Lessons’, Journal of Palestine Studies, 18:2, 1989, p.60.

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  10. Sharon’s interview with Oriana Fallaci, The Washington Post, 21 August 1982.

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  11. Israel Landers, Did we fail by taking a false bet? (Tel Aviv: HaDoar, 1984), p.594.

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  12. David Wurmser, ‘Egyptian-Centrism in Israeli Strategic Planning: The Peace for Galilee Operation’, SAIS Review, 4:2, 1984, p.72.

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  13. Joseph Kraft, ‘Milhemet Breira’ (War of Choice), Ma’ariv, 20 August 1982.

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© 1998 Kirsten E. Schulze

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Schulze, K.E. (1998). The Rise and Fall of the Alliance. In: Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in Lebanon. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230372474_8

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