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Abstract

Despite Eisenhower’s overwhelming victory in the presidential election in November 1956, the Democrats continued to dominate Congress. Then, during his second term, the president lost key officials who had helped to formulate or had supported his New Look doctrine.1 Gruenther’s decision to retire at the end of November 1956 was in Eisenhower’s words ‘a shocker’.2 Humphrey, who Eisenhower had described as ‘mentally qualified for the Presidency’, resigned in May 1957,3 followed by Wilson, who resigned after the Sputnik shock in October 1957. Despite all his shortcomings Wilson had pressed forward with reductions in defence expenditures to meet the requirements of the New Look. Humphrey’s successor, Robert B. Anderson (a former secretary of the navy and deputy defense secretary) would also be conscientious in his efforts to keep down defence expenditures, while John McElroy, Wilson’s replacement, tried to ameliorate inter-service rivalry, albeit with little success. Radford, an ardent promoter of the New Look, retired in August 1957. His successor, General Twining, was an equally enthusiastic supporter of the New Look, as was Sherman Adams, Eisenhower’s White House chief of staff. However, the latter was accused of accepting gifts in return for political favours and was forced to resign in September 1958, just before the midterm Congressional elections.4

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Notes and References

  1. Ambrose, Eisenhower vol. 2, p. 524; Alistair Horne, Macmillan 1957–1986 (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 133; Donovan, Confidential Secretary, pp. 132–5.

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  3. See Paul Nitze, ‘Atoms, Strategy and Policy’, Foreign Affairs 34 (January 1956), pp. 187–8.

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© 1996 Saki Dockrill

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Dockrill, S. (1996). Facing the Nuclear Equation. In: Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953–61. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230372337_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230372337_10

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-349-39735-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-230-37233-7

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