Abstract
Liberty had a single central meaning for most of its history: government by law to serve the common good. Libertas meant life without subjection, except to public reason, expressed through elections. This last provision protects the rest and represents the point where republicanism and liberalism first explicitly diverged in the early nineteenth century. Even before this separation, partisans of monarchy frequently emerged to challenge liberty and question its republican antecedents. Thomas Hobbes, one of the subtlest and most lucid of such theorists, made a profound impression on subsequent debate, to the extent that republican liberty lost its meaning for many, and often even self-styled “liberals” and “republicans” now use Hobbesian terminology.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsNotes
Isaiah Berlin Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford, 1958) p. 7.
John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832), ed. Wilfrid E. Rumble (Oxford, 1995) Lecture V, p. 160.
E.g. David Miller (ed.) Liberty (Oxford, 1991), pp. 2–3.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1998 M.N.S. Sellers
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Sellers, M.N.S. (1998). New Conceptions of Liberty. In: The Sacred Fire of Liberty. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230371811_17
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230371811_17
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-40604-3
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-37181-1
eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)