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India ‘ looks East’

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India’s Rise to Power

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Abstract

India’s interest in Asian nations lying to its east has never been as strong as it has in those regions to its west. In part this attitude is cultural and historical: the great invasions of India all came from the west. India’s introduction to modern technology was through the colonisation process, and it has until recently shared alove-hate’ relationship with western technology. The conquests of Islam led to the development of a significant cultural affinity between north India and southwest Asia, one that involves language (Hindi and Urdu are significantly Persianised), art through Moghul miniature painting and other mediums, architecture, and food. The fact that political and cultural power tends to be located in the populous north, where the cultural connection with Southwest Asia is strongest, rather than in the south, through which the cultural links with Southeast Asia were originally extended, also gives rise to the perception of stronger linkages with nations to the west than to the east.

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Endnotes

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  1. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia

    Sandy Gordon

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© 1995 Sandy Gordon

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Gordon, S. (1995). India ‘ looks East’. In: India’s Rise to Power. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230371804_14

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