Abstract
Wittgenstein is vehement that what is crucially wrong in Frazer’s account is his attempt to explain rituals, say the killing of Rex Nemorensis. This prohibition on explanation requires attention. It is a central feature not only of Wittgenstein’s reflections on religion, but also of those of his followers (witness the title of one of D. Z. Phillips’ books: Religion Without Explanation), and it seems a most bizarre and obscurantist injunction. We should do well, then, to isolate what it is about rituals that render them non-explainable. This will take us right into the heart of the Wittgensteinian interpretation of religion.
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© 1999 Brian R. Clack
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Clack, B.R. (1999). The Prohibition on Explanation. In: Wittgenstein, Frazer and Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230371682_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230371682_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-40020-1
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-37168-2
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