Abstract
Marx took from Hegel the supremacy of general historical forces over the deliberate actions of individuals in determining the course of events. History for Hegel is the unfolding of the Universal Mind or Spirit in its progress towards absolute self-knowledge and its final return from alienation in the identity of Knowing and Being. Marx accepted the notion of the inevitable laws of the unfolding of history but deposed the Mind or Spirit from a sovereign position in the historical order of things. He turned Hegel on his head and discovered ‘the rational kernel within the mystical shell’ of Hegelian thought (Capital, p. 20). For him the motor of history was not the intrinsic dynamic of Universal Spirit dialectically quarrelling with itself, but the complex and enormous consequences of the fact that man, uniquely among the animals, produced the means of his own subsistence. History was the dialectic arising out of the material forces of production and the relations of production. Historical idealism was consequently replaced by an historical materialism in which the economic structure was the fundamental basis of human society. What Marx retained from Hegel was a view of history and the affairs of human life in which individuals had very limited ability to influence the course of events — although in Marx’s view, the shots were called not by the Universal Mind but by the productive process.
My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which under the name of ‘the Idea’, he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external phenomenal form of ‘the Idea’. With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing less than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought1
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Notes and References
Karl Marx, Capital Volume 1, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, Afterword to the second German edition (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1970), p. 19.
It is important not to accept Marx’s exaggerated account of the distance between himself and Hegel. G.A. Cohen (Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978),
quoted by Allen Wood (‘Hegel and Marxism’, in Frederick C. Beiser, (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, Cambridge, 1993) has expressed the affinity between Hegelian and Marxian theories of history, as follows: ‘Marx’s conception of history preserves the structure of Hegel’s but endows it with fresh content’ (p. 433). They both regard history as the history of human activity and identify human history with the development of objective social practice. From the point of view of the present argument, the crucial sense in which Hegel is a precursor of Marx, is that he, like Marx, mounts a radical ‘critique of individualist models of agency, especially self-conscious, rational agency’ (R.B. Pippin, ‘You Can’t Get There From Here: Transition Problems in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, in Beiser, ibid., p. 53).
Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, trans. N.I. Stone (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1904), p. 30.
Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought, vol. 1 trans. Richard Howard and Helen Weaver (London: Penguin Books, 1968), p. 121.
K. Marx and F. Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, trans. Samuel Moore (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1952), p. 72.
Isaiah Berlin, ‘Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century’ in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 13–14.
(Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism II: The Golden Age, trans. P.S. Falla, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 42).
Albert Camus, The Rebel, trans. Anthony Bower (London: Penguin Books, 1971), p. 168.
Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’, in Essays on Ideology (London: Verso, 1984), p. 11.
I owe this way of expressing Althusser’s view to Geoffrey Hawthorn, Enlightenment and Despair (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 228. The privileged status of science would not, of course, be accepted by the Sociologists of Knowledge but, as we have seen, the sociologisation of knowledge comes up against precisely the difficulty that Marxists acknowledge: science-as-ideology does not explain why science is so successful in explaining and predicting events, nor why science-based technology works.
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© 1997 Raymond Tallis
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Tallis, R. (1997). Marx and the Historical Unconscious. In: Enemies of Hope. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230371569_6
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