How Do International Institutions Influence the EU? Advances and Challenges

  • Xinyuan Dai
  • Gina Martinez
Part of the Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics book series (PSEUP)


The primary objective of this chapter is to highlight the key contributions of this volume to one of the most important and vibrant literatures in International Relations, namely the second-image-reversed literature. We argue that this volume helps broaden the second-image-reversed perspective and we identify the important ways in which this volume helps move the research frontier in that literature forward.


World Trade Organization International Institution International Labour Organization International Maritime Organization Domestic Actor 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Xinyuan Dai and Gina Martinez 2012

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  • Xinyuan Dai
  • Gina Martinez

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