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Memory Traces between Brain Theory and Philosophy

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Brain Theory
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Abstract

The theory of memory traces and its critics have a long history. From the beginning, long before the first actual characterization of memory traces, memory acquired an ontological status, whether the latter challenged the relevance of traces a priori, or on the contrary legitimized it. Today, the search for memory traces has become a fundamental part of neuroscience. In this context, their significance and their contribution to brain theory is actively debated. The philosophical discussions on the pertinence of research on brain traces continue. For philosophers like David Krell, such debates are like an illusory quest for the Holy Grail (Krell 1990). For others, like John Sutton, there is a healthy continuity between old ideas and contemporary connectionism (Sutton 1998).

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© 2014 Jean-Claude Dupont

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Dupont, JC. (2014). Memory Traces between Brain Theory and Philosophy. In: Wolfe, C.T. (eds) Brain Theory. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230369580_2

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