NATO and Flexible Response, 1966–1970

Abstract

Captain Kirk: Well, Mr Saavik, are you going to stay with the sinking ship?

Saavik: Permission to speak candidly, sir?

Kirk: Very well.

Saavik: (fights emotion) I don’t believe this was a fair test of my command capabilities.

Kirk: And why not?

Saavik: Because … there was no way to win.

Kirk: A no-win situation is a possibility every commander may face. Has that never occurred to you?

Saavik: … No, sir. It has not.

Kirk: How we deal with death is at least as important as how we deal with life, wouldn’t you say?

Saavik: (falters) As I indicated, Admiral, that thought had not occurred to me.

Kirk: Then you have something new to think about. Carry on.

Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan, The Kobayashi Maru Test

The ‘no win’ scenario outlined in the 1982 film The Wrath of Khan has deeper origins beyond popular culture. One hundred and fifty years before, in 1832, Carl von Clausewitz, a commander schooled in the Napoleonic Wars, recognised the limitations of military strategy to achieve victory in his masterpiece On War. As a more recent study has shown, the principle of a no-win scenario is one that ‘explicitly recognises the limitations on the use of military force’.¹