Conclusion

Abstract

This book has three main fulcrums to its arguments related to the questions set out in the introduction. The first relates to the retention of Polaris when it could have been cancelled without serious financial penalty, the second to the decision to withdraw forces East of Suez, and the third the formation of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the simultaneous movement into a strategy of Flexible Response. Each of these related issues encompassed a series of diverse topics focused on the inheritance of Polaris by Harold Wilson’s Labour government from the Conservative MacMillan and Douglas-Home administrations, the decision in 1967 to initiate a phased stand-down of military commitments East of Suez, and the evolution of nuclear sharing and strategy in NATO. The balance between capabilities and commitments represented by the move to Polaris, the move away from East of Suez, and the decision to prioritise NATO, all had ripple effects in all areas of UK nuclear weapons policy.