Abstract
An organism is an environmental interaction that continuously regenerates itself. It does not follow from the past, but it does take account of it. We can show that the regenerating is a kind of precision. We call it ‘implicit precision’.
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© 2012 Eugene T. Gendlin
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Gendlin, E.T. (2012). Implicit Precision. In: Radman, Z. (eds) Knowing without Thinking. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230368064_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230368064_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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