Abstract
In philosophy of mind and related disciplines, the standard conceptions of mind have been formulated in terms of a problem space that excludes certain solutions to problems defined in that space. I’ll argue that this is the case in much of the recent discussion of social cognition, but also in earlier discussions of artificial intelligence (AI). I’ll try to show this by looking at versions of the frame problem — a problem that seems to fall into this solution-resistant space. To be precise, it is not that the frame problem itself has not been properly formulated, but rather that the ways various theorists think of the mind prevent certain solutions from coming into place. Even when a solution is on the horizon, it is often blocked from counted as a solution because our general conception of the mind has not been properly formulated.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Baldwin, D. A. (1993) ‘Infants’ ability to consult the speaker for clues to word reference’, Journal of Child Language, 20, 395–418.
Baldwin, D. A., J. A. Baird, M. M. Saylor, and M. A. Clark (2001) ‘Infants parse dynamic action’, Child Development, 72 (3), 708–17.
Brandt, L. and P. A. Brandt (2005) ‘Making sense of a blend: a cognitive-semiotic approach to metaphor’, Annual Review of Cognitive Linguistics, 3, 216–49.
Brooks, R. (1991) ‘Intelligence without representation’, Artificial Intelligence, 47, S9
Bruner, J. and D. A. Kalmar (1998) ‘Narrative and metanarrative in the construction of self’ in M. Ferrari and R. J. Sternberg (eds.), Self-Awareness: Its Nature and Development (New York: Guilford Press), 308–31.
Crane, T. (1996) The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representation (London: Penguin).
De Jaegher, H., E. Di Paulo, and S. Gallagher (2010) ‘Can social interaction constitute social cognition?’, Trends in Cognitive Sciences. Published online 30 July 2010. 10.1016/j.tics.2010.06.009
Dennett, D. C. (1991) Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown and Company).
Fiebich, A. and S. Gallagher (under review) ‘Joint attention: from interaction to joint action.
Fauconnier, G. and M. Turner (2002) The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind’s Hidden Complexities (New York: Basic Books).
Fodor, J. A. (1991) ‘Searle on what only brains can do’ in D. M. Rosenthal (ed.), The Nature of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 520–1.
Gallagher, S. (in press) ‘Narrative competency and the massive hermeneutical back-ground’ in P. Fairfield (ed.) Education, Dialogue, and Hermeneutics (New York: Continuum).
Gallagher, S. (2009) ‘The key to the Chinese Room’ in K. Leidlmair (ed.), After Cognitivism (Dordrecht: Springer), 87–96.
Gallagher, S. (2007) ‘Social cognition and social robots’, Pragmatics and Cognition, 15 (3), 435–54.
Gallagher, S. (2005) How the Body Shapes the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Gallagher, S. (2004) ‘Understanding problems in autism: interaction theory as an alternative to theory of mind’ Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology, 11, 199–217
Gallagher, S. (2001) ‘The practice of mind: Theory, simulation or primary interaction?’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8(5–7), 83–108.
Gallagher, S. and D. D. Hutto (2008) ‘Understanding others through primary interaction and narrative practice’ in J. Zlatev, T. Racine, C. Sinha, and E. Itkonen (eds.) The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity (Amsterdam: John Benjamins), 17–38.
Gallagher, S. and D. Zahavi (2008) The Phenomenological Mind (London: Routledge).
Goldman, A. I. (2005) ‘Imitation, mind reading, and simulation’ in S. Hurley and N. Chater (eds.) Perspectives on Imitation II. (Cambridge MA: MIT Press), 80–91.
Green, A. and K. S. Eklundh (2003) ‘Designing for learnability in human—robot communication’, IEEE Transactions on industrial electronics, 50 (4): DOI: 10.1109/TIE.2003.814763.
Harnad, S. (1989) ‘Minds, machines and Searle’, Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 1, 5–25.
Harnad, S. (2002) ‘Minds, machines, and Searle 2: What’s right and wrong about the Chinese Room argument’ in J. Preston, and M. Bishop (eds.) Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press).
Hashimoto, M., Y. Misaki, and U. Tatsuy (2009) ‘Effects of emotional synchronization in human—robot KANSEI communication’, The 18th IEEE International Symposium on Robot and Human Interactive Communication, Toyama, Japan, 27 September-2 October 2009.
Haueeland, I. (1985) Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea (Cambridge. MA: MIT Press).
Hobson, P (2002) The Cradle of Thought (London: Macmillan)
Hutto, D. D. (2008) Folk Psychological Narratives: The Socio-Cultural Basis of Understanding Reasons (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press).
Kollar, T., S. Tellex, D. Roy, and N. Roy (2010) ‘Toward understanding natural language directions. Human-Robot Interaction (HRI)’, 5th ACM/IEEE International Conference. DOI: 10.1109/HRI.2010.5453186, 259–66.
Lepore, E. and R. Van Gulick (eds.) (1991) John Searle and his Critics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
Meltzoff, A. N. and M. K. Moore (1977) ‘Imitation of facial and manual gestures by human neonates’, Science, 7 (4312), 75–78.
Nichols, S., and S. P. Stich (2003) Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
Reddy, V. (2008) How Infants Know Minds (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Rey, G. (1986) ‘What’s really going on in Searle’s ‘Chinese Room’, Philosophical Studies, 50, 169–85.
Rey, G. (2002) ‘Searle’s misunderstandings of functionalism and strong AI’ in J. Preston, and M. Bishop (eds.) Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press).
Rochat, P. (2010) ‘Is social cognition an oxymoron? Comments on Astington and Edward, Miller, Moore and Sommerville’ in R. E. Tremblay, R. G. Barr, R. DeV. Peters, M. Boivin (eds.), Encyclopedia on Early Childhood Development [online]. Montreal, Quebec: Centre of Excellence for Early Childhood Development: 1–5. Available at: http://www.child-encyclopedia.com/documents/RochatANGxp.pdf. Date accessed 2 November 2010.
Searle, J. R. (1980) ‘Minds, brains and programs’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417–57
Searle, J. R. (1981) ‘Minds, brains, and programs’ in J. Haugeland (ed.) Mind Designs (Montgomery, VT: Bradford Books).
Searle, J. R. (1983) Minds, Brains and Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Searle, J. R. (1991) ‘Response: The background of intentionality and action’ in E. Lepore and R. Van Gulick (eds.) John Searle and His Critics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell)
Searle, J. R. (1992) The Rediscovery of the Mind (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
Trevarthen, C. B. (1979) ‘Communication and cooperation in early infancy: A description of primary intersubjectivity’ in M. Bullowa (ed.) Before Speech (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 321–48.
Trevarthen, C. and P. Hubley (1978) ‘Secondary intersubjectivity: Confidence, confiding and acts of meaning in the first year’ in A. Lock (ed.) Action, Gesture and Symbol: The Emergence of Language (London: Academic Press), 183–229.
Wieger, L. (1965) Chinese Characters: Their Origin, Etymology, History, Classification and Signification. A Thorough Study from Chinese Documents, L. Davrout (trans.) (New York: Dover/Paragon).
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2012 Shaun Gallagher
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Gallagher, S. (2012). Social Cognition, the Chinese Room, and the Robot Replies. In: Radman, Z. (eds) Knowing without Thinking. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230368064_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230368064_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-33025-6
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-36806-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)