Abstract
The common understanding of intentionality and consciousness is still so dominated by thought and linguistic representation that even those who see that thought and language require a background of more basic know-how often conceive it as being pre-intentional, non-representational, and non-conscious. In this chapter, I want to argue that the background is non-conceptual rather than non-representational and non-conscious, and that it is conscious and intentional in the sense that background know-how essentially manifests itself in conscious and intentional episodes and performances, in perceptual and actional experiences with non-conceptual intentional content, in experiences of familiarity or surprise, or in the sense of being ready and knowing how to do things.
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© 2012 Michael Schmitz
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Schmitz, M. (2012). The Background as Intentional, Conscious, and Nonconceptual. In: Radman, Z. (eds) Knowing without Thinking. New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230368064_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230368064_4
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