Introduction: Review of the Literature

Abstract

Scholarship and policy analysis on CSDP have grown exponentially since the operationalization of CSDP in 2003.* Most works are descriptive and prescriptive: of these, many are monographs published by think tanks, such as the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). Authors tend to cover a gamut of conclusions about the EU in crisis management, reflecting different national, theoretical, and perceptional perspectives. While Adamski (2006) posits that the EU in international security is not just a new departure but ‘charts new territory as it operates off the map,’ Gamble and Lang (2009) and Hughes (2010) offer a critical account of the EU as a coherent and effective foreign policy actor. Asseburg and Kempin (2009) critique the union as a credible actor in international crisis management, faulting it for deployments without clear mandates (Kosovo) or failure to meet pledges for deployments of personnel (Afghanistan). Indeed, many authors conclude that the EU continues to be a fragmented, inconsistent, and ineffective player in military crisis management. Yet few of these works are theoretical — which means they explain little in terms of why operations are undertaken and change. Still fewer focus on the areas of research that are the objects of study in this book — the difficult questions of measuring and evaluating effects on the ground, on the union itself, and on other international security providers.