Conclusion: The Kantian Critique of Just War Theory

Abstract

In this book we have looked at Kant’s theory of war in a number of steps, seeking to place it in the context of his philosophy as a whole and within the context of his two major publications on politics: Perpetual Peac. and the Metaphysics of Morals. What I have tried to bring out is not merely Kant’s predominant thinking about war and its justifiability but also a view that is internally consistent. Arguably no thinker is wholly consistent throughout the extent of their philosophical systems, and Kant is as fallible as most philosophers in this respect. Indeed it is possible to suggest that he is such a fecund and continually innovative thinker—never quite repeating the same precise sequence of argument—that it would be wrong to expect total consistency in his approach. This is certainly the case with his treatment of the acceptability of war where at times his views seem starkly to diverge. Nonetheless, I have attempted to bring together an account that explains the basic place of the idea of war in his system and then seeks to bring a harmony to the various diverging judgments. It is of course for the reader to judge my success in doing this. But it is my firm view that there is a coherent Kantian view on war that can be defended in the context of Kant’s political, historical and legal philosophy.

[…] unter denen allein ein allgemeiner Völkerbund möglich ist. Denn wenn gleich keine öffentliche Gerechtigkeit da ist, so sind doch Völker an das gebunden, wodurch sie allererst moglich ist.

Kant: AA XIX, Erläuterungen zu G. Achenwalls Iuris …, Seite 598