ASEAN after the Cold War: Capital, Crisis, Conflict

Abstract

Having feared for their very survival in the 1960s and 1970s, ASEAN’s capitalist regimes stabilised and strengthened remarkably during the following decade. Thanks in part to their interventions in their near-abroad, the anti-communist military, bureaucratic, political and business elites which dominated ASEAN states defeated the threat of revolution. The sub-region’s relative political stability and its suppression of labour unrest made it an attractive venue for foreign investment, which expanded rapidly following the de-regulation of global capital flows in the mid-1970s. This helped fuel the export-oriented, state-led development that ASEAN governments had prioritised to undercut the popular appeal of communism, generating rapid economic growth. By the 1990s, several ASEAN members had become second-tier ‘tiger’ economies. The region defied conventional wisdom by modernising economically while remaining politically undemocratic, which elites justified with reference to the so-called ‘Asian values’ of hierarchy, hard work and social harmony. In a sudden reversal, however, this impressive façade collapsed in the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which caused widespread social unrest and toppled governments. ASEAN was powerless to respond, and has emerged from the crisis enduringly weakened, its image tarnished and its relevance constantly questioned.

The common threat of communism… made for solidarity for ASEAN. After the collapse of communism, ASEAN needed a new common objective that could unite the group.

— Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (2000, p. 382)

Before, it was the Communists who stirred up rebellion everywhere, including in Malaysia. Now we have the liberal democrats doing exactly the same in the same manner, complete with supplies of arms. Whether it is a communist or a liberal democratic insurrection, the people suffer not one bit less.

— Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad ¹