Abstract
For almost a century the representative agent in economic science was a charming, sophisticated character who routinely and resolutely balanced costs and benefits when he had to take a decision. When dual-reasoning systems came into vogue the economic agent was exposed as a feeble-minded hedonist, a myopic individual who has to be supervised and trained to regain some self-control.
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© 2012 Jan de Jonge
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de Jonge, J. (2012). Summary. In: Rethinking Rational Choice Theory. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230355545_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230355545_24
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-32553-5
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-35554-5
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