Conclusion: The Future Maneuvers of the Great Powers

Abstract

The great power relations at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century were at a watershed. China was definitely enhancing its political clout, largely because, despite the global economic meltdown of 2008–9, its economy remained vibrant. That very reality created a situation whereby the global power arrangements were inexorably edging away from unipolarity toward bipolarity. However, the emergence of a bipolar global order was far from a done deal. The United States (US) — entirely unlike the United Kingdom (UK) at the end of World War II, when it started to lose its status as a great power — did not appear to be an exhausted power, either economically or militarily (still an excellent example of internal balancing through a combination of effective use of economic wealth and consistently high investments in defense-related research and development). According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ (IISS) publication, The Military Balance 2009, the United States’ total defense equipment budget for 2008 was reported to be $125 billion, thereby placing the hegemon at number one in that category of global ranking. This figure was expected to go down to $115 billion for 2015. China was ranked at number two, with the total defense equipment budget at $16 billion for 2008. But that figure was expected to rise to $29 billion for 2015. India’s ranking in that category was number 5, with the total defense equipment budget at $9 billion for 2008. This figure was expected to rise to $17 billion for 2015. Finally, Russia was ranked at number 10 for that category, with the total defense equipment budget for 2008 at $6 billion. This figure was expected to increase to $11 billion for 2015.¹