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Empathy, Altruism and Normative Ethics

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The Moral Dimensions of Empathy
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Abstract

Empathy contributes to our knowledge of others, but empirical research on empathy also suggests that it tends to cause or motivate altruistic action. The empirical evidence suggests that when individuals empa- thetically take up the perspectives of others and feel others’ emotions, they put the concerns and needs of those others ahead of their own. Such studies do not nullify the idea that empathy has epistemic functions, for it is entirely possible that certain types of empathy have epis- temic functions and motivate altruism. This chapter will examine this possibility and investigate the relationship between the epistemic functions of empathy and the consequences of empathy. My suggestion is that the empirical research is important for understanding the psychological and moral effects of perspective-taking empathy in clinical settings, but it does not tell us about when people actually empathize in real life situations, when they ought to empathize, or how empathy relates to our moral duties and obligations to others. Moreover, while empirical research reveals the likely effects of empathy, it also shows that people tend to empathize with those who are most similar to themselves. Empathy appears to be biased in favor of those with whom one is most similar.

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Notes

  1. Michael Slote (2007) The Ethics of Care and Empathy, New York: Routledge, p. 13.

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  2. The non-cognitive mode of imitation has been shown to have prosocial consequences and affects the way people perceive and interact with their social environment. Jean Decety and colleagues discovered that in studies where one subject was imitated (by mimicking his or her non-verbal behavior) and one subject was not, the imitated subject was more likely to help the experimenter when she tripped; another study tested the effects of mimicking language, and showed that when waitresses verbally mimicked their customers when taking their orders (as opposed to merely paraphrasing the order), they received better tips--the difference was more than 50 per cent between the amount of tips received from mimicry versus nonmimicry. Decety et al. conclude that mimicry “affects us in a way that goes beyond building a special bond with the mimicker. It makes us generally more prosocial as people.” (Rick B. van Baaren, Jean Decety, Ap Dijksterhuis, Adries van der Leij and Matthijs L. van Leeuwen (2009) “Being Imitated: Consequences of Nonconsciously Showing Empathy,” The Social Neuroscience of Empathy, edited by Jean Decety and William Ickes, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 31–42.)

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  3. His research started in the late 1970s but is collected in Batson (1991) The Altruism Question: Toward a Social-Psychological Answer, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum Publishers.

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  4. Daniel Batson, C., Lishner, D., Carpenter, A., Dulin, L., Harjusola-Webb, S., Stocks, E., Gale, S., Hassan, O. and Sampat, B. (2003) “‘…As You Would Have Them Do Unto You’: Does Imagining Yourself in the Other’s Place Stimulate Moral Action?” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(9): 1190–1201.

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  5. Batson, C.D., Early, S. and Salvarani, G. (1997) “Perspective- taking: Imagining How Another Feels Versus Imagining How You Would Feel,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20: 751–758.

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  6. For example, Eva Kittay describes the inability of people to connect with her intellectually disabled daughter as follows: “her limitations in communication make much of what goes on in her mind opaque to those around her” and what others “project onto her and what is really her own experience cannot but remain conjectures.” See Eva Kittay (2005) “Equality, Dignity, and Disability,” in Mary Ann Lyons and Fionnuala Waldron, eds. Perspectives on Equality: The Second Seamus Heaney Lectures, Dublin: The Liffey Press, p. 97.

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  7. Philosophers Karsten Stueber and Shaun Nichols dispute the empathy- altruism hypothesis. See Steuber’s discussion of empathy and altruism in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/empathy/index.html) and Shaun Nichols, Sentimental Rules, Chapter 2. Nichols argues that studies in developmental theory indicate that “altruistic motivation is independent of sophisticated mindreading abilities like perspective- taking.” Sentimental Rules, p. 48. Philosopher Elliot Sober and biologist David Sloan Wilson argue that Batson’s psychological evidence for altruism is inconclusive and that there are better--evolutionary--explanations for altruism: altruistic people (and other animals) are more reproductively fit and evolutionarily stable than those who are not altruists. See Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson (1998) Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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© 2011 Julinna C. Oxley

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Oxley, J.C. (2011). Empathy, Altruism and Normative Ethics. In: The Moral Dimensions of Empathy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230347809_4

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