Extending the Theory II: Indexicality

Abstract

If the theory of descriptions is to be a proper part of a theory of natural language semantics, it must be compatible with all other proper parts of the whole theory. These will include theories of linguistic phenomena such as anaphora, tense, nominalization, and many others. As Neale (1990: 10) observes, the best approach the natural language semanticist can take here is a modular one, dealing with each phenomenon in a piecemeal fashion and subsequently piecing them together. It is well beyond the scope of this book to deal with all of the phenomena that demand explanation. In this concluding chapter I want to focus on one in particular: indexicality. However, the phenomenon is, I will argue, so central that it has repercussions for other important and puzzling linguistic phenomena including the semantics of propositional attitude reports. As this book is not just concerned to defend the theory of descriptions, but also to defend Russell’s philosophy of language in general, I will focus particularly on Russell’s work on indexicality. Russell’s work in this area has received very little attention (and even less positive appraisal). I want to show, however, that there is more value in Russell’s analysis of indexicality than it has thus far been given credit for. The bulk of Russell’s writings that I will draw on are to be found in his later works, particularly An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth and Human Knowledge.