Abstract
If the Meinongian interpretation of the Principles is to be rejected as the motivation behind Russell’s adoption of his 1905 theory, what account can we give in its place to explain why Russell abandoned the earlier theory for the later one? We know that Russell’s main concern during the period between the completion of the Principles and the writing of Principia was the contradiction and its relations. It is certainly not implausible, therefore, to speculate that this concern played some role in motivating the theory of descriptions.
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© 2011 Graham Stevens
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Stevens, G. (2011). History II: ‘On Denoting’ and the Genesis of the Theory of Descriptions. In: The Theory of Descriptions. History of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230343191_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230343191_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-29936-2
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-34319-1
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