Bosnia—1991–1995

Abstract

The US intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) stands out from the other case studies in that it is the only case where US policy makers were doubtful that there was an American security interest at stake. They avoided intervention as long as possible. But, unlike the other cases where intervention resulted in difficult and protracted war in the target country, in Bosnia once a serious military effort was made to end the conflict, it was quickly successful and with no loss of American life. But even in Bosnia, a difficult political dilemma lingers. The success of the effort in Bosnia has been primarily to stop the violence and transfer the conflict to the political arena.

The city will be divided into Muslim, Serbian, and Croatian sections, so that no ethnic groups will have to live or work together.”

“Do you mean,” I asked, “that Sarajevo will be like Berlin before the wall was destroyed?”

“Yes,” he answered, “our vision of Sarajevo is like Berlin when the wall was still standing.

Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader, on his vision for the future of Sarajevo, responding to US ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann during their last meeting in 1992