Abstract
In this work we intend to understand whether Italian Popular Banks’ particular corporate governance has implications for the profitability and efficiency of these banks and for the behaviour of these banks across economic cycles, like the recent financial crisis. Part of the literature comprises the peculiarity of Popular Banks in the wider panorama of local banks: being near to the customers allows banks which operate in a limited geographical area to enjoy advantages as regards information. Such advantages can be traced back to the fact that local bank managers can take account of a large range of factors, such as the loan-holder’s personal characteristics and those of the local markets, when evaluating the creditworthiness of small businesses.
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© 2011 Pierluigi Morelli and Elena Seghezza
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Morelli, P., Seghezza, E. (2011). The Italian Popular Banks and Their Behaviour after the Recent Financial Crisis. In: Molyneux, P. (eds) Bank Performance, Risk and Firm Financing. Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230313873_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230313873_9
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