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Changes in Board Composition and Compensation in Banking from 1999 to 2008

  • Pablo de Andrés-Alonso
  • Eleuterio Vallelado-González
Part of the Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions book series (SBFI)

Abstract

A board of directors is one of the most important corporate governance instruments available to banks. Another is the design of compensation packages for managers and directors to align their goals with those of other bank stakeholders: owners, creditors, depositors, taxpayers and regulators. Stakeholders can complement monitoring with incentive pay schemes by making the manager a residual claimant to the additional value obtained by his/her actions. However, compensation models for banks do not only have to align managerial and shareholder incentives, but must also avoid excessive risk-taking that may result in systemic risk (Bolton et al., 2010; Gordon, 2010).

Keywords

Corporate Governance Executive Director Executive Compensation Board Independence Board Composition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Pablo de Andrés-Alonso and Eleuterio Vallelado-González 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • Pablo de Andrés-Alonso
  • Eleuterio Vallelado-González

There are no affiliations available

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