Abstract
We have completed our investigation of why Britain parted company with France and other EEC countries in the early years of European monetary cooperation between 1970 and 1979. In the introduction to the book we referred to five factors as possible answers to the above question: (1) Britain’s special relationship with the United States; (2) the legacies of the Empire; (3) economic considerations; (4) attachment to national sovereignty; and (5) the characteristics of the national party system. Then we examined their relative importance by means of four case studies: Britain’s policy towards EMU during her entry negotiations with the EEC, 1970–71 (Chapter 3); Britain and the EEC’s first steps towards EMU, 1971–74 (Chapter 4); a comparison of British and French policies during the currency crisis of 1976 (Chapter 5); and the establishment of the EMS, 1978–79 (Chapter 6). By way of concluding remarks, we first summarise our findings, and then explain the theoretical contributions of this research.
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© 2011 Daisuke Ikemoto
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Ikemoto, D. (2011). Conclusion. In: European Monetary Integration 1970–79. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230307933_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230307933_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-31911-4
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-30793-3
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