EU Policy on Ukraine During and Since the Orange Revolution: ‘A door neither closed nor open’

Abstract

Policy related to Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution’ is widely cited as one of the most notable recent successes in European foreign policy, in which member state governments and EU institutions acted in a united and concerted fashion in favour of democratic transition. This chapter seeks to explain how such unity arose, when prior to the latter stages of the revolution significant differences had persisted within the EU over the appropriate role that Europe should play in relation to Ukraine’s political evolution. In line with this book’s theoretical focus (Thomas, ch.2), it is suggested that a combination of ‘normative entrapment’ and ‘cooperative bargaining’ help us explain policy agreement in the case of Ukraine. The dynamics of rhetorical entrapment were particularly potent in explaining why a number of member states initially reluctant to back the Orange Revolution did eventually do so. At the same time, it is pointed out that such dynamics were enabled by very specific circumstances and that unity was also facilitated by other exogenous factors; in this sense, policy also exhibited elements of cooperative bargaining and reaction to changing geostrategic factors.

1 The author wishes to thank Jos Boonstra, Natalya Shapovalova, Balazs Jarabik and colleagues at the preparatory workshops to this volume for their input, along with the diplomats interviewed in Kyiv and Brussels over various trips during 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008.