Abstract
The military hierarchy would appear to be a perfect example of the strictly centralized system of power that Vladimir Putin saw as the only way to exert presidential control, and which is still seen by the ruling elite as the most ‘organic’ for Russia despite President Dmitri Medvedev’s penchant for liberal rhetoric. Indeed, the Commander-inChief (CinC) should be able not only to order the launch of any number of strategic missiles by opening the legendary ‘black suitcase’, but also strategically to direct a military operation in every potential theatre of war; he also controls the money flow (since the military system is not supposed to have independent sources of income) and makes major decisions on numerical cuts/increases and reorganizations. In reality, however, an order from the top might not arrive at all at the combat units concerned, not only because the means of communication are unreliable but also, more importantly, because the twisted chain of command has too many weak links.
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Notes
That replacement has been examined in P. Baev (2004). ‘The Decline of the General Staff Leaves Reform in Limbo’, Jane’s Intelligence Review, October, pp. 48–9.
See, for instance, L. Radzihovsky (2008). ‘Lobachevsky Diplomacy’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 5 August;
Y. Simonyan (2008). ‘There will Be No War’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 July.
On the exercises, see V. Mukhin (2008). ‘Militant Peacekeepers’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 July; on Russia’s possible aims in the war
see A. Illarionov (2009). ‘The Russian Leadership’s Preparation for War, 1998–2008’. In S. E. Cornell and S. F. Starr (eds). The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War against Georgia. Armonk NY & London: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 49–84.
A detailed and valuable account appears in Y. Latynina (2008). ‘On the Russian-Georgian War: 200 km of tanks’, Ezhednevny zhurnal, 19, 20, 21 November (http://ej.ru/?a=note&id=8579).
This question has been examined in P. Baev (2008). ‘Vae Victors: The Russian Army Pays for the Lessons of the Georgian War’, PONARS Eurasia Memo 46, Washington: Georgetown University, December.
Pavel Felgengauer holds a contrary view: ‘As the Russian military staffs made preparations for the planned August 2008 invasion of Georgia under the cover of the military exercises Kavkaz-2008, additional strategic reinforcements were mobilized for a possible escalation of hostilities in the eventuality that Washington would offer Tbilisi assistance and get directly involved in the fray.’ See P. Felgengauer (2009). ‘After August 7: The Escalation of the Russian-Georgian War’. In S. E. Cornell and S. F. Starr (eds). The Guns of August 2008: Russia’s War against Georgia. Armonk NY & London: M. E. Sharpe, pp. 162–80, on p. 180. I have not found sufficient evidence to support such a hypothesis.
A sharp commentary is A. Golts (2007). ‘Civilian Control Putin-Style’, Ezhednevny zhurnal, 24 February (http://ej.ru/?a=note&id=6230).
See V. Litovkin (2008). ‘Under-Carpet Victory’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 4 June; V. Litovkin (2008). ‘Generals’ Demarche’, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 28 March.
A good overview of reform guidelines is V. Solovyev (2008). ‘Military Reform 2009–2012: Full Collection of MoD Essays’, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 12 December.
See V. Solovyev (2008). ‘The CinC Did Not Come to the Generals’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 14 November.
See V. Mikhailov (2009). ‘Russian Military-Brigade Order’, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 22 May.
Former Defence Minister Pavel Grachev argues that the idea of eliminating the professional group of praporshchiki goes completely against the main thrust of reform (of which he is very critical) towards greater professionalism in the Armed Forces; see V. Umantsev (2009). ‘No Point in Learning from our Adversaries’, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 20 March.
See A. Golts (2009). ‘The Break of the Contract’, Ezhednevny zhurnal, 5 May (http://ej.ru/?a=note&id=9047).
See V. Litovkin (2009). ‘Two Sensations in One Week’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 24 April.
The government has granted the MoD the right to organize auctions to sell off the surplus land since January 2009, but half of these auctions were cancelled due to a lack of claims; see D. Aizenshtadt And E. Surnacheva (2009). ‘Voentorg to itself’, Gazeta.ru, 15 January (http://www.gazeta. ru/politics/2009/01/15_a_2924742.shtml);
A. Stepanov (2009). ‘Not an Inch to the Enemy!’, Versiya, 2 November (http://versia.ru/articles/2009/nov/02/prodazha_voennih_zemel).
A full-blown assault on Serdyukov’s reform project is O. Elensky (2009). ‘A New Military Profile is in ‘Shock and Waver”, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 May. Even such a mainstream liberal expert as Aleksei Arbatov confirmed that ‘all this reforming, call it whatever you want, leaves a very unpleasant impression’.
See A. Arbatov (2009). ‘Current Issues and Logic of the Military Reform: Round Table at the NVO’, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 24 April.
See I. Konovalov and M. Muradov (2009). ‘Nobody But Him’, Kommersant, 26 May;
V. Solovyev and V. Ivanov (2009), ‘Generals Launch a Counter-Offensive’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 28 May.
See R. Anin (2009). ‘General and Glyba’, Novaya gazeta, 21 September.
See P. Felgengauer (2009). ‘18 Brumaire of Vladimir Shamanov’, Novaya gazeta, 28 September.
For my detailed examination of that intrigue, see P. Baev (2008). Russian Energy Policy and Military Power. Routledge. London, particularly pp. 82–3.
See A. Hramchihin (2009). ‘Mixture of Syndromes, Self-Deception and Lies’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 29 May.
See V. Solovyev 2009). ‘Odd Metamorphosis in Military Reforms’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 16 January.
See A. Hazbiev and V. Tyumenev (2009). ‘Bulava will Hit Like a Boomerang’, Expert, 2 February.
See A. Golts (2007). ‘Flying, but Very, Very Low’, Ezhednevny zhurnal, 23 August (http://ej.ru/?a=note&id=7348).
See V. Myasnikov (2009). ‘High-Flying Words from the Generals’, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 13 February.
The loss of one Tu-22M long-range bomber was a particularly shocking setback; see V. Kamenev (2008). ‘What Can Russian Pilots Fly?’, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 19 September.
Admiral Sergei Gorshkov was the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy from 1956 to 1985 and organized its expansion into a powerful oceangoing force that was particularly strong in submarines but had no aircraft carriers. For a good description, see ‘Russia: Power Play on the Oceans’, Time, 23 February 1968; a sober Russian view is G. Kostev (2000). ‘The Phenomenon of an Admiral’, Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie, 25 February.
See V. Litovkin (2008). ‘No Place for Building Aircraft Carriers in Russia’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 13 October.
See for instance, S. Miller and D. Trenin (eds) (2004). The Russian Military: Power and Policy. The MIT Press. Cambridge MA & London; and a more recent argument in
A. Arbatov (2006). ‘Russian Military Policy Adrift’, Briefing Paper, vol. 8, no. 6, November. Carnegie Center. Moscow.
On the scope of the crisis, see A. Illarionov (2009). ‘Big Leap Back’, Gazeta. ru, 30 April (http://www.gazeta.ru/comments/2009/04/29_x_2981108.shtml); on the impact on the system of power
see N. Petrov (2009). ‘Russian Political Mechanics and the Crisis’, Lecture at the Bilingua club, 21 May, available at (http://www.polit.ru/lectures/2009/05/14/petrov1.html).
D. Medvedev (2009). ‘The Elite are Elite Precisely because They Learn Fast’, interview with Kommersant, 4 June.
One of the strongest proponents of the professional sergeant corps is Vitaly Shlykov. See, for instance, N. Poroskov (2009). ‘Brave Accountant: Experts on the Military Reform’, Vremya novostei, 15 January.
On the resistance to the plan to downgrade the status of the Caspian Flotilla, see V. Muhin (2009). ‘Military-Caspian Metamorphosis’, Nezavisimaya gazeta, 4 June.
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Baev, P. (2011). Crooked Hierarchy and Reshuffled Networks: Reforming Russia’s Dysfunctional Military Machine. In: Kononenko, V., Moshes, A. (eds) Russia as a Network State. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230306707_4
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