Disintegrated Semi-Presidentialism and Parliamentary Oligarchy in Post-Orange Ukraine

Abstract

This chapter focuses on what can be termed “disintegrated semipresidentialism,” a system in which coordination between the president and parliament is almost absent, based on a case study of Ukraine. In contrast to the other extreme of semi-presidentialism, which is highly presidentialized semi-presidentialism (see Chapter 11),¹ “disintegrated semi-presidentialism” has not attracted the scholarly attention it deserves. A reason for this lack of study is that usually this is no more than a transitional, uncertain conjuncture of power, rather than a viable regime type, and, therefore, there cannot be many examples. Indeed, a number of post-communist countries underwent this uncertainty in their departure from a Soviet pseudoparliamentary regime, but chose between president-parliamentary and premier-presidential regimes relatively quickly, thus raising the integrity of the regime (Figure 11.1). Ukraine’s peculiarity is that it consolidated “disintegrated semi-presidentialism” with its 1996 constitution, and the constitutional amendment in December 2004, in the midst of the Orange Revolution, barely improved this situation.