Abstract
One1 of the great and influential events of Keynes’s youth was the publication of Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica (Whitehead and Russell, 1910–1913). Keynes was enormously impressed by this work, and to some extent took it as the inspiration for A Treatise on Probability (TP) (Keynes, 1973 [1921]). To some extent only, because Keynes clearly rejected the atomism and some of the empiricism associated with Russell’s philosophy of science. Nevertheless he never became a subjectivist with regard to probability.
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© 2011 Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.
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Kyburg, H.E. (2011). Logic, Empiricism and Probability Structures. In: Brandolini, S.M.D., Scazzieri, R. (eds) Fundamental Uncertainty. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230305687_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230305687_2
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