Conflict Resolution in the Council by Linkage of Commission Proposals

Abstract

In the literature on Council conflict resolution, several studies observe a remarkable high capacity of the Council to find solutions which are almost consensually supported by the member states (see e.g. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1995; Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006; Heisenberg 2005; Lewis 2000; Naurin and Wallace 2008; Westlake 1995). According to the voting records of the Council, member states almost always vote in favour of Commission proposals (Hayes-Renshaw et al. 2006: 7; Heisenberg 2005: 77; Mattila and Lane 2001: 44). Similarly, the most recent empirical studies on EU legislative decision-making reveal that Commission initiatives are continuously adopted, even if the member states pursue different interests in highly contested issues of a Commission proposal (Bueno de Mesquita and Stokman 1994; Junge and König 2007; König and Pöter 2001; Thomson et al. 2007). However, although these studies find contestation in the Council on a large number of issues, little is known about how the Council solves these conflicts. Even scholars who argue that informal norms govern the voting behaviour in the Council (e.g. Achen 2006; Heisenberg 2005, 2008; Lewis 2003, 2008) conceive Council decision-making as a black box in which norms prevent the member states from rejecting a proposal — even if they have an interest in the maintenance of the status quo. Above all, some of them conclude that member states are following a logic of appropriateness when voting for a Commission proposal, based on a communicative process in which norms can be justified and actors may overcome their interests (Risse 2000: 7). In this world, member states are supposed to search for ‘communicative consensus, a phrase which nicely fits the Council’s culture and is supported by the empirical record of consensus-based outcomes’ (Lewis 2008: 168).