Abstract
This chapter examines the relationship between particular and general moral judgments. In Section 2, I argue why a top-down approach is problematic. In Section 3, I discuss Jonathan Dancy’s particularist ontology and his arguments against generalist accounts of moral knowledge. My conclusion is that Dancy’s arguments against general-ism in normative metaphysics are very attractive and that particular moral judgments can be justified in themselves and not only in so far as they refer to general judgments. However, in Section 4 I argue that Dancy’s particularism has to be supplemented with a theory of intuitions and emotions. Particular intuitions should be understood as noninferential judgments, and we need emotions in order to make context-sensitive ethical judgments.
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© 2011 Sabine Roeser
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Roeser, S. (2011). Particular Intuitions and Emotions. In: Moral Emotions and Intuitions. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230302457_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230302457_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-31305-1
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-30245-7
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