Introduction

Abstract

Though the final goals of European integration have long been subject to debate, there was little doubt that the main concerns lay squarely within Europe. In Alan Milward’s seminal account, national governments were concerned, above all, to meet the rising expectations of their own populations, particularly in the domain of economic welfare (Milward, 1992). In Andrew Moravcsik’s account of integration, economic interests within European states are defended through interstate bargains (Moravcsik, 1998). In both cases, the interaction between economics and politics within Europe lies at the heart of European integration. In the neo-functionalist canon, integration occurs through depoliticized ‘spill-over’ effects: forward movement in one policy area begets — rather in the manner of the dictum: ‘give them an inch and they will take a mile’ — further integration in another area. Excluded from this logic, however, is foreign and security affairs (Hoffmann, 1995, p. 33; Ohrgaard, 1997). For more idealistic scholars and policymakers, European integration has been about peace: the idea that ‘ever closer Union’ ensures European states no longer fight each other as they did in the first half of the twentieth century (Guisan, 2003; Mayne, 1970, p. 21; cf. Milward, 1992, pp. 318–344).