Abstract
Internalist theses, as they are usually stated, describe a necessary relation between an agent’s having a reason and some other, usually motivational, fact about the agent. So, for example, internalists might claim that an agent can have a reason to perform some act only if he has a relevant desire, or only if he would be motivated to perform it in suitably idealized circumstances. Why should we accept internalism about reasons?
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© 2011 Julia Markovits
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Markovits, J. (2011). Internal Reasons and the Motivating Intuition. In: Brady, M. (eds) New Waves in Metaethics. New Waves in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230294899_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230294899_8
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-230-25162-5
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