Abstract
A detailed analysis of the Greek political system, which follows in Chapter 3, shows how that system hands over unchecked and unsupervised mandates to the winners of elections in an environment of weak institutions and in the presence of strong and “wealthy” special interest groups. At the same time, the slow and malleable proceedings of the judiciary ensure that any unlawful actions usually are not persecuted efficiently. This completes the design of a system in which reform-minded politicians, who threaten the status quo, are easily removed from the political scene. Those politicians who cooperate with the interest groups are rewarded not only with long-lasting political careers, but also with immunity from prosecution against almost any unlawful acts they may engage in, even if such acts are unrelated to their office and if their immunity violated basic human rights, as demonstrated for example by Application 24895/07 filed with the European Court of Human Rights and the subsequent condemnation of the Greek government’s decision. The incentives formed by the details of the existing system also can explain other aspects of the Greek political system, including the undemocratic structure of the political parties and their tendency to accommodate and propagate the corrupt practices that are widespread throughout Greek society.
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© 2011 Michael Mitsopoulos and Theodore Pelagidis
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Mitsopoulos, M., Pelagidis, T. (2011). Vikings in Greece. In: Understanding the Crisis in Greece. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230294752_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230294752_2
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