Abstract
The secure strategic anchors of the cold war have been wrenched free, presenting defence planners with new challenges, new opportunities and some new, but mostly old, constraints. On the one hand, an increasingly fluid strategic environment combined with an exponential growth in technology multiplies the range of options that planners must consider. On the other hand, shrinking defence budgets and the growing costs of supporting legacy systems limits their scope for real choice. To add further complexity, technology-push is competing with developing doctrines, declining budgets and the diversification of means of conducting conflict. In the midst of this vortex of change, challenge and uncertainty, a concept is now dominating Western military debate: namely that through the fusion of information technology, precision targeting and smart delivery systems, a Revolution in Military Affairs is taking place.1 All indications confirm that a civil/military technological revolution is under way, led, at a significant distance, by the armed forces of the US. Whether this military technological revolution translates into a revolution in military affairs remains to be seen2. The RMA would certainly have transformed the battlefield of the Cold War era; whether it can be proved that an RMA will transform the battlespace3 in the post-cold war strategic environment will determine whether it eventually becomes just another footnote in the history of military operational concepts.
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Notes and references
The US Department of Defense Office of Net Assessment defines an RMA as a major change in warfare brought about by the innovative application of technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine, and operational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of operations.
For a broader assessment of the RMA that goes beyond the military/ technological debate, see L. Freedman, ‘The Revolution in Strategic Affairs’, International Institute for Strategic Studies Adelphi Paper 318.
The battlefield is three dimensional — land, sea and air. The battlespace encompasses the two additional dimensions of cyber and space.
Marshall N. V. Ogarkov, ‘Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland’, 25 March 1982, see also his Mayday article, and Cohen ‘A Revolution in Warfare’ pp. 39–41.
JCS, the American Revolution in Military Affairs. For an authoritative explanation see William A. Owens, ‘JROC: Harnessing the RMA’ Joint Forces Quarterly 5, Summer 1994.
For a critical review of the RMA, see Colin S. Gray, ‘The American Revolution in Military Affairs: an Interim Assessment’, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, no. 28.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, 1997.
For this see the following SSI monographs: Jeffery R.Cooper ‘Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs’; Earl H Tilford, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs: Prospects and Cautions’; Michael J. Mazarr, ‘The Revolution in Military Affairs: a Framework for Defence Planning’.
Martin van Creveld, ‘On Future War’, p.58.
World Bank, ‘World Population Predictions 1994–1995’.
As in the siege of Hue, during Tet in 1968: ‘we had to destroy the city to save it’.
US, Canada, Japan, France, Germany, UK and Italy.
‘The New Geopolitics Survey’, The Economist, 31 July 1999.
‘Asia and the Future Economic System’ — Chatham House 17–18 March 1999.
Concurrency in the sense of simultaneous military operations.
Israel — salinization; Jordan, Syria and Iraq — desertification.
See, Hamish McRae, The World in 2020 (London: HarperCollins) 1994.
NCIS Conference, 1–3 Mar 99.
Ibid.
AC David Veness, ‘Protecting Against Conventional Attack’, RUSI Journal, December 1998, p. 26.
Price Pritchett, New Work Habits for a Rapidly Changing World Pritchett and Associates Inc.: Tyne and Wear 1997.
Metal matrix composites, ceramic composites and carbon/carbon composites are but a few examples. For a useful summary of new materials and their application in aerospace, see Gareth Corsi, ‘A Material World’, Aerospace International, August 1999.
Technology development at the molecular level.
Cold fusion and superconductivity.
Lasers, particle beams, microwave systems.
Avionics gave birth to ‘vetronics’ in armoured fighting vehicles, the increasing electronics fit for the individual soldier warrants similar labelling. If suitable power sources become available, we could see a return to equipping the man instead of manning equipment.
Russia and China are the obvious candidates for peer competitor status, but in the case of Russia, internal security rather than external expansion is likely to be the dominant feature on the political agenda. Much is made of China as a potential replacement for Russia, with estimates of Chinese GDP exceeding the US in parity purchasing power by 2025, but these estimates predated the Asian financial crisis, and current indications are that China’s structural economic and political problems will absorb the ruling elite for a considerable period, perhaps tens of years. Sabre rattling towards Taiwan will continue, and may even result in conflict, but this will be regional. Even if China sustains ‘tiger’ levels of GDP growth, it will still take decades to modernize her forces.
It is a reasonable assumption that what was considered unacceptable in say the 1960s, compared with what would be considered unacceptable now, would differ by orders of magnitude.
The Gulf war, Chechnya and Kosovo can all be classified as regional conflicts.
Benjamin S. Lambeth, ‘Technology and Air War’, Air Force Magazine, November 1996.
See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010, 1997.
For a comprehensive discussion on the moral aspects of the RMA, see Charles J. Dunlap Jr, ‘Technology and the 21st Century Battlefield: Recomplicating Moral Life for the Statesman and the Soldier’, Strategic Studies Instititute, 1999.
The Army After Next (AAN) focused on land warfare beyond 2010, and was the first coherent translation of the implications of the RMA in terms of future land force structure planning. See MG Robert H. Scales Jr, ‘Future Warfare’, Strategic and Combat Studies Institute.
Ibid.
Chinese Views of Future Warfare, edited by Michael Pilsbury, National Defense University Press, revised edition, September 1998.
For example, should European national forces aim for intra-operability between their own arms first, or with similar arms in the coalition, or should interoperability with perhaps the USAF be the primary requirement?
It could be argued, with some justification, that European defence will require a ‘revolution in bureaucratic affairs’ before it can hope to deliver an RMA. Interestingly, this same criticism has been levelled at the US, from within the US defense community, giving rise to the term ‘the bureaucracy after next’ to match the US Army’s ‘army after next’.
The debates on tank versus attack helicopter, direct fire versus’ smart’ indirect fire and balance between generic’ smart’ and ‘dumb’ munitions characterize this increasingly topical subject.
An additional issue is the ease with which ‘digital’ forces can be bolted onto ‘analog’ command structures. The area where there seems to have been least discussion is how the RMA will impact upon the command hierarchies.
Martin van Creveld, ‘On Future War’.
See Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘The Lessons and Non-lessons of the Air and Missile war in Kosovo’, Report to the USAF XP Strategy Forum, CSIS, 8 July 1999.
Small War Manual, U.S. Marine Corps, (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1940), ch 1.
These questions were posed by Dr Paul Hollinshead in his ICS/ISTAR — Force Development Issues paper, RUSI Journal December 1998. Although the focus of the paper was ICS/ISTAR, the questions are generic.
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© 2001 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Branch-Evans, S.J. (2001). Evolution of Warfare: How will the Revolution in Military Affairs Make a Difference?. In: Matthews, R., Treddenick, J. (eds) Managing the Revolution in Military Affairs. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230294189_3
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