Particularism and Subjectivity

Abstract

Although according to moral particularism, principles need not be in themselves metaphysically or rationally dubious, the order of priority between principle and particular runs from the latter to the former. Thus, whatever moral principles exist, they ‘are learnt in and from particular cases’ (Dancy, 1985a, p.151), and it is also suggested that an agent who is in possession of a ‘large list of principles … [could be] at an advantage when coming to a decision in a particular case’ (Dancy, 1985a, p.150). Notwithstanding the admission that principles can be learnt, and it can be a good thing to learn them from the point of view of moral reasoning, the role of principles is nevertheless highly restricted. Recall from Chapter 1 §1.4 that ‘a moral principle amounts to a reminder of the sort of importance that a property can have in suitable circumstances’ (Dancy, 1985a, p.150).