The Caucasus Conflict and the Role of Law

Abstract

At the turn of this century, the editors of a special issue of the journal International Organization suggested that a greater ‘move to law’ was occurring and that a trend towards the ‘legalization of world politics’ was taking place.¹ While this view was contemporaneously criticised as presenting a simplistic conception of law, one which failed to adequately account for the dynamic interaction between norms and policies and between legal and political actors,² the basic insight that international law and politics intersected seemed undeniable. The 2003 Iraq invasion shook this view. Realists (and ‘neo-cons’ who thought of themselves as realists) were quick to point out that hard power was back – if indeed it had ever gone – and that any ‘liberal moment’ that had emerged in the 1990s (evidenced by robust collective action through the Security Council and the creation of the International Criminal Court, among other things) had ended.³ Many legal scholars perceived a ‘crisis in confidence’ for international law. Some responded to this ‘crisis’ by suggesting that international law reorient itself to new threats and new realities, chipping away for example at the 1945 United Nations (UN) Charter framework that restricted the use of force to narrow exceptions.⁴