Wittgenstein: Belief, Knowledge and Certainty

Abstract

In this chapter we will begin to explore Wittgenstein’s position with respect to scepticism and common sense. We will start by considering his account of the use of the verb ‘to know’, as well as of other doxastic expressions, such as ‘to believe’ and ‘to be certain’. Many of the entries in On Certainty (henceforth, OC) are outright criticisms of Moore’s position. Yet, the relationship between the two is more complex than it first appears. For instance, we know that Wittgenstein greatly admired ‘A defence of common sense’ (DCS), even if he had some reservations about it, while he was very critical of ‘Proof of an external world’. The reasons behind such an assessment had mainly to do with the fact that Wittgenstein thought that, in the first essay, Moore had spotted something extremely interesting, from a philosophical point of view. Namely, that there are a number of everyday propositions, mostly about physical objects, which are certain, while having nothing to do with the propositions traditionally considered beyond the possibility of doubt in philosophy, viz. logical necessities and self-verifying propositions. By contrast, according to Wittgenstein, in his later work Moore had embarked on an utterly misleading philosophical project, viz. the project of giving a proof of a philosophical proposition like ‘There is an external world’.