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The Search for a Comprehensive Settlement

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Part of the book series: Advances in Political Science: An International Series ((ADPOSC))

Abstract

The EC invested much effort in 1991 to bring about a comprehensive political settlement, encompassing all the parties involved in the Yugoslav crisis. This initiative was pursued in parallel to the effort to stop the wars in Slovenia and Croatia through the conclusion of ceasefire agreements.

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Notes

  1. Stanley Hoffmann, ‘Yugoslavia: Implications for Europe and for European Institutions’, in Richard H. Ullman (ed.), The World and Yugoslavias Wars (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), p. 111.

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  2. Alan Riding, New York Times, 29 June 1991.

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  3. See Chapter 4, pp. 59–60.

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  4. Henry Wynaendts, Lengrenage (Paris: Editions Denoël, 1993), pp. 50, 68–9; Michael Libal, Limits of Persuasion, op. cit., p. 22ff.

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  5. On Croatian hopes, see Mihailo Crnobrnja, The Yugoslav Drama (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), p. 194; Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a Catastrophe, op. cit., p. 154.

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  6. These phrases appear in the Lake Ohrid Statement, reproduced in Review of lnternational Affairs (Belgrade), vol. 42, nos 995–7 (1991), p. 6. See also Zimmermann, Origins, op. cit., p. 153.

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  7. Stipe Mesić, Kako Smo Sruŝili Jugoslaviju (How We Brought Down Yugoslavia) (Zagreb: Globus, 1992), p. 179.

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  8. Review of International Affairs (Belgrade), vol. 42, nos 995–7 (1991), p. 8. For a detailed description of the meetings see Mesić, Kako Smo Sruŝili Jugoslaviju, op. cit., pp. 131–2, 172–9.

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  9. Mesić, ibid., pp. 224–6.

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  10. The Council of Ministers’ decision was circulated as UN Security Council document S/22902 (7 August 1991).

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  11. Libal, Limits of Persuasion, op. cit., pp. 39–40. On the atmosphere among EC officials after the coup see Europe no. 5553 (26/27 August 1991), pp. 3–4.

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  12. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Siedler, 1995), pp. 946–7; Geoffrey Edwards, ‘The Potential Limits of the CFSP: The Yugoslav Example’, in Elfriede Regelsberger, Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), Foreign Policy of the European Union (Boulder, co: Lynne Rienner, 1997), p. 176.

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  13. These Council of Ministers decisions were circulated as UN Security Council documents S/22991 (29 August 1991) and S/23010 (4 September 1991).

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  14. Donald Rothchild, Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1997), p. 174. See also Stephen John Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974–1980 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991), p. 199.

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  15. Conférence de Presse Conjointe de M. le Président de la République et de M. Richard von Weizsäcker, Président de la République Fédéral d’Allemagne, mimeo (Château de Weimar, 20 September 1991).

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  16. Zimmermann, Origins, op. cit., pp. 154–5, 162, 164; Genscher, Erinnerungen, op. cit., pp. 947–8; Javier Perez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), pp. 483–4.

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  17. For descriptions of this drama see Mesić, Kako Smo Sruŝili Jugoslaviju, op. cit., pp. 207–11, and Wynaendts, Lengrenage, op. cit., pp. 75–77. The text of the ultimatum is reproduced in UNSC S/22991, 29 August 1991.

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  18. Quoted in the Christian Science Monitor, 6 September 1991. For Delors’ and van den Broek’s views see European Report, no. 1701 (7 September 1991). See also James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 53–5.

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  19. David Owen, Balkan Odyssey (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1995), pp. 31–3. The quotations are taken from Owen’s reproduction of van den Broek’s memorandum.

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  20. For more on the events surrounding the conference and the proceedings see Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 173–82; Wynaendts, Lengrenage, op. cit., pp. 117–31.

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  21. The quotes are taken from UN document S/23169, 25 October 1991, Annex VII.

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  22. For the debate on the word ‘nation’ see Mesić, Kako Smo Srusili Jugoslaviju, op. cit., pp. 306–7.

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  23. S/23169, 25 October 1991, Annex VI, Para. 2.5.

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  24. 18 October — Section 2.7; 25 October — Article 2.6.

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  25. Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Armonk, NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), pp. 89–91.

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  26. The Times, 16 November 1991, p. 11.

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  27. Laura Silber and Allan Little, Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation (New York: TV Books, 1995), pp. 194–5.

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  28. Genscher, Erinnerungen, op. cit., p. 961; Libal, Limits of Persuasion, op. cit., pp. 79–80.

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  29. European Report, no. 1735 (15 January 1992); Europe, no. 5647 (16 January 1992).

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  30. Genscher (Erinnerungen, op. cit., pp. 964–8) claims that it had beneficial effects.

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  31. Further Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991), S/23513, 4 February 1992, para. 13.

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  32. Perez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage, op. cit., pp. 494–5.

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  33. Owen, Balkan Odyssey, op. cit., p. 343; Wynaendts, Lengrenage, op. cit., pp. 149–50; Lord Carrington, ‘Turmoil in Balkans’, RUSI Journal, vol. 137, no. 5 (1992), pp. 1–2.

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  34. A similar criticism is offered by Zimmermann, Origins, op. cit., pp. 161–2.

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  35. These were former Secretary of State James Baker’s words. See James A. Baker III, with Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995), p. 638.

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  36. EC Council of Ministers’ declarations on Yugoslavia of 7 August (S/22902) and 27 August (S/22991).

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  37. Carrington may have been influenced by his experience as mediator in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe settlement in the late 1970s, when he was able to obtain concessions from Robert Mugabe’s Patriotic Front by threatening that Britain would formally recognise a government headed by its rival, Bishop Abel. Muzorewa.

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© 2002 Saadia Touval

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Touval, S. (2002). The Search for a Comprehensive Settlement. In: Mediation in the Yugoslav Wars. Advances in Political Science: An International Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230288669_5

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