Transcendental Imagination, Schematism and Judgment

Abstract

One of the greatest controversies in Kant scholarship concerns the reading of the Transcendental Deduction.¹ Kant himself was well aware of the difficulty of the discussion undertaken in this section of the First Critique. In the Preface to the first edition he described the ‘enquiries’ undertaken there as most important for ‘exploring the faculty we entitle understanding, and for determining the rules and limits of its employment’ (Axvi) and as having cost him ‘the greatest labour’. The enquiry is stated there to have two sides. One refers to ‘the objects of pure understanding’ and is intended to ‘expound and render intelligible the objective validity of its a priori concepts’, which is ‘essential’ for Kant’s purposes (Axvi). The other side seeks to investigate the pure understanding itself, ‘its possibility and the cognitive faculties upon which it rests’, and is therefore concerned with the subjective aspects of the faculty. This latter side of the investigation is ‘of great importance for my chief purpose’, but ‘it does not form an essential part of it’ (Axvi–xvii). He is concerned to stress that even if the subjective side of the deduction does not convince, this does not touch his objective demonstration.