Abstract
The last two chapters demonstrated that Armenia and Georgia like many other post-Soviet countries have inherited systemic corruption from Soviet rule. Due to the different nature of their political transitions, Armenia and Georgia’s systems of corruption have developed in different directions. In contrast to Armenia’s highly centralized system of corruption, the Georgian government under Shevardnadze largely failed to arrive at a shared agreement to curb corruption among its ministers and limit state officials’ illicit activities. In this chapter, I argue that the type of systemic corruption has made a difference for Armenia and Georgia’s political and economic development. It has largely done so in ways that were hypothesized in Chapter 1 (see Table 1.1).
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© 2006 Christoph H. Stefes
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Stefes, C.H. (2006). Centralized and Decentralized Systemic Corruption: Assessing the Consequences. In: Understanding Post-Soviet Transitions. Euro-Asian Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230287464_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230287464_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-51876-0
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-28746-4
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