A Theoretical Framework for Understanding the Role of Corruption in Post-Soviet Transitions

Abstract

Fifteen years after the fall of Soviet rule, it has become obvious that few of the Soviet Union’s successor states were primed for democracy and a market economy. There were great hopes that the end of communism would provide millions of people with the genuine opportunity for a fresh start. In 1992, Francis Fukuyama declared ‘The End of History’ and the final victory of liberal democracy over all other ideologies (Fukuyama 1992). Although few endorsed Fukuyama’s thesis, many believed that swift transitions from authoritarian regimes to Western-style democracies were a possibility (Di Palma 1991). Concerning economic reforms, neoliberal economists offered readymade reforms to the post-Soviet governments, promising a bright future for their economies as long as the state stopped meddling with the free market’s invisible hand. Several scholars argued that the complete breakdown of the Soviet institutions provided a unique opportunity for a fresh start (e.g. Åslund 1995, Geddes 1995). Taking advantage of the institutional vacuum, the rapid introduction of new political and economic institutions modeled after European and American institutions would deny former elites their political and economic influence and set the post-Soviet countries on a stable path towards democracy and economic prosperity.