Divergent Imperialism? Britain and the Restoration of French Power in North Africa, 1945–49

Abstract

The evolution of French North Africa had been discernible ever since 1935–6 and we had done nothing. Our empire’s loyalty at the time of our defeatin 1940 had temporarily obscuredits fragility. But as earlyas 1945 the revolt in the province of Constantine and the grave developments in Syria and Indo-China ought to have claimed our attention and led to important political decisions. Instead, owing to political paralysis in Paris and the conservative influence of the overseas French, rigidity was the order of the day… (General André Beaufre)¹

Written by a general later to serve as French task force commander during the Suez expedition in 1956, André Beaufre’s harsh judgment on French colonial policy in 1945 reveals several elements common in assessments of France’s postwar North African crisis: decisive opportunities for reform were missed; consideration of imperial withdrawal was impossible owing to the imperative of French recovery after defeat in 1940; there was a failure of political will in Paris; and, ultimately, the colon settlers were principally to blame for the impending disaster. This chapter revisits these themes by examining the degree to which British policy-makers, diplomats and specialist officials regarded French North Africa as a looming problem for France, Anglo-French relations and the western alliance in the immediate postwar years.