‘To the Last Round’: the Defense of Hong Kong, 1948–50

Abstract

The advance of the Peoples’ Liberation Army into South China in 1949 posed a potential threat to Hong Kong. The British government followed a two track approach to counter this threat. Its first move was to send an infantry division as a deterrent against attack, which also signified the government’s secret determination that it would go to war with China over Hong Kong. Its second move was to seek some level of accommodation with the Chinese Communists in order to limit its long-term military liability to Hong Kong. The British hoped that in according early recognition to the People’s Republic of China it could preserve their extensive trade interests and assure the continued economic viability of a British Hong Kong. But they also hoped that by ‘keeping a foot in the door’ they would be able to exploit any possible Sino-Soviet split. These hopes were dashed by Chinese moves against British and other Western businesses, but also by Britain’s own actions in the ‘Amethyst affair’ and in its refusal to back the People’s Republic’s assumption of the Chinese chair in the United Nations Security Council.