Following the presentation and examination of the supervisory regime of home country control, this chapter turns to the actors behind the scene and sets the investment services policy process of the EU in its institutional context. Research in investment services regulation and supervision has tended to concentrate on defining appropriate objectives and standards and on issues related to efficiency in their operation. Only during the past couple of years have questions on institutional structures received increasing attention and have become a major issue of policy and public debate.1 The primary reason for this attention is more than obvious. Almost ten years after the 1992 EU ‘big bang’, it is a common belief that the ‘new regime’ of financial regulation and supervision has not delivered the benefits envisaged by its creators.


Capital Adequacy Supervisory Authority Banking Supervision Basel Committee International Financial Institution 
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© Yannis V. Avgerinos 2003

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